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Abstract Tax reform proposals in the spirit of the “flat tax” model typically aim to
reduce three parameters: the average tax burden, the progressivity of the tax sched-
ule, and the complexity of the tax code. We explore the implications of changes in
these parameters for entrepreneurial activity, measured by counts of firm births. The
Swiss fiscal system offers sufficient intra-national variation in tax codes to allow us
to estimate such effects with considerable precision. We find that high average taxes
and complicated tax codes depress firm birth rates, while tax progressivity per se pro-
motes firm births. The latter result supports the existence of an insurance effect from
progressive corporate income taxes for risk-averse entrepreneurs. However, implied
elasticities with respect to the level and complexity of corporate taxes are an order of
magnitude larger than elasticities with respect to the progressivity of tax schedules.
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1 Introduction
Despite a recent recession-induced shift toward more progressive taxation, the flat-
tax model retains widespread appeal. By March 2012, 26 countries were operating
flat-rate income tax systems, as were seven US states.1 Many other countries and
regions have considered reforms that would flatten their tax schedules. The most fre-
quently invoked argument in favor of flat taxes is that they simplify both compliance
and enforcement, but moving toward flat-rate taxation has a host of other economic
implications, in terms of both efficiency and equity.2 In this paper, we focus on one
efficiency-related dimension of a particular type of flat tax: the impact of flat-rate
corporate income taxes on the generation of new firms.3
The specific choice between flat and progressive corporate tax rates is a topic of
ongoing debate in a number of industrialized countries. The United States, for ex-
ample, raises a progressive federal corporate income tax, as do Japan and the United
Kingdom. Conversely, Canada, France, Germany, Italy and Spain apply essentially
flat-rate corporate taxes (with some exceptions for small businesses). The two ap-
proaches sometimes coexist at sub-national level. In the United States, 31 states levy
flat-rate corporate income taxes, 17 states levy progressive corporate income taxes
and three states do not tax corporate income.
Births of new firms, in turn, are of interest for at least two reasons. First, we con-
sider them a proxy for entrepreneurship, which, following Schumpeter, has come to
be regarded as a key driver of economic growth.4 Second, the number of firms choos-
ing to start operations in a particular jurisdiction can be taken as a measure of that
jurisdiction’s locational attractiveness.
Our empirical work is based on data for Switzerland, which offers a well suited
setting for an analysis of this issue. While the Swiss federal government levies a flat-
rate corporate income tax, a wide variety of (flat and progressive) tax schedules are
applied at the sub-federal level, by Switzerland’s 26 fiscally autonomous cantons.
Furthermore, below the cantonal level, some 2,700 municipalities levy taxes at often
very different average rates and with some further variations in progressivity.
We exploit the variation of tax schedules within Switzerland for an analysis of
the impact of corporate tax progressivity on the creation of new firms. Our analy-
sis is organized around three dimensions of corporate income taxes: the implications
1See en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flat_tax.
2See, e.g., Keen et al. (2008) for a general appraisal of recent flat-tax reforms.
3By considering corporate taxes in isolation, we take a narrower view than the most radical flat-tax model,
in which a single tax rate is applied across all tax bases and corporate income may be taxed only when
paid out as dividends (see, e.g., Hall and Rabushka 2007).
4This intuitive assertion finds theoretical support in endogenous growth models, where entrepreneurs are
primarily cast in the role of conduits between scientific research and market-oriented production (see, e.g.,
Michelacci 2003). We can also invoke some relevant empirical evidence. Reynolds et al. (1995) and Au-
dretsch and Fritsch (2002) have found that regions with higher firm formation rates enjoy higher growth,
in the United States and Germany, respectively. These results were broadly confirmed by a number of
country-level studies in the January 2008 special issue of Small Business Economics (see Fritsch 2008).
Employing indirect measures of entrepreneurship, Glaeser et al. (1992) have found industry-level employ-
ment growth to be higher in US with below-average firm sizes; and Murphy et al. (1991) have reported
positive growth effects of the share of engineering graduates in a large cross section of countries.
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of higher or lower average tax burdens (the “level effect”), the implications of pro-
gressivity (the “insurance effect”), and the implications of tax complexity. To the
best of our knowledge, ours is the first study to evaluate these three effects jointly.
The smallness and regulatory homogeneity of Switzerland coupled with considerable
intra-national variance in tax regimes limit the potential for estimation bias due to
unobserved locational determinants of firm births.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we re-
view the relevant literatures on firm births, firm location, taxation and risk taking. In
Sect. 3, we present a simple model of risk taking and progressive taxation to formal-
ize the intuition of the insurance effect. In Sect. 4 we present our empirical model and
our data set for Switzerland. Estimation results are reported and discussed in Sect. 5.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature background: taxes and firm births
2.1 The tax level effect
The three dimensions of corporate tax policy we focus on have previously been sub-
ject to very different degrees of scientific scrutiny. While relatively little attention has
been paid to the effect of corporate tax progressivity, and even less evidence exists on
the implications of tax complexity, there exists an extensive theoretical and empirical
literature on the effect of changes in the level of (average and marginal) corporate tax
rates. The available evidence strongly supports the existence of a moderating impact
of the level of corporate taxes on firm births at both the national and the local level.5
In a related strand of literature, economists have explored the impact of corporate
tax levels on “income shifting” between the personal and the corporate tax base. Most
tax systems leave considerable room for manoeuvre on this choice, mainly via dif-
ferent organizational forms and via flexible accounting rules governing the heading
under which the remuneration of owner-workers is declared. Several available stud-
ies show that, not surprisingly, the share of income that is declared as corporate is
higher the lower is the level of corporate relative to personal income taxes (see, e.g.,
Gordon and Slemrod 2000; Goolsbee 2004; Cullen and Gordon 2007; and de Mooij
and Nicodème 2008). Some of the observed income shifting into the corporate tax
base is due to the incorporation of previously non-corporate organizations or due to
the division of larger corporations into smaller firms. In that sense, income shifting
also contributes to the creation of new firms.
2.2 The tax progressivity effect (insurance effect)
If tax payers’ decisions are made under uncertainty, the progressivity of tax schedules
will have implications that differ from those of the level of (average effective) taxes.
5For international evidence, see e.g. de Mooij and Ederveen (2003), Hines (2007), and Da Rin et al. (2011);
and for recent intra-national evidence see Feld and Kirchgässner (2003), Guimaraes et al. (2004), Rathelot
and Sillard (2008), Duranton et al. (2011), and Brülhart et al. (2012).
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Thus, under uncertainty, the variance of the tax bill matters in addition to the expected
level of the tax bill.
Domar and Musgrave (1944) have famously shown that taxation can encourage
risk taking.6 Whilst assuming a flat-tax schedule, they also took account of loss-
offset provisions that imply a negative tax in case of losses. A higher tax rate then
reduces both the expected level and the expected variance of post-tax income, which,
depending on investor preferences, may make risky ventures relatively more attractive
by reducing risk through an implied insurance effect of taxation.
The Domar–Musgrave model, by featuring a flat tax over positive income, is not
well suited to a formal distinction between the implications of changes in the level
of the expected tax bill and changes in progressivity per se. An intuitive conjecture
from the Domar–Musgrave result is that increased progressivity, provided it does not
affect the expected tax bill, should be favorable to entrepreneurial risk taking.7 This
intuition is supported to some extent by formal analysis. Ahsan (1974) considered in-
vestment in a risky asset under a flat-rate tax with and without a tax-exempt threshold,
the former corresponding to a progressive schedule. Conditional on constant expected
tax revenue, he found that risk taking is greater under the progressive tax than under
the proportional tax, given standard assumptions on investors’ aversion to risk. In a
similar model, Cowell (1975) found that progressivity favors investment in the risky
asset if the utility function is assumed to be quadratic, but may deter risk taking under
different preferences.8 Gordon (1985), allowing for a general form of risk aversion
and corporate tax progressivity in a general-equilibrium setting, found that raising
the marginal tax rate, other things equal, promotes investment while raising the aver-
age tax rate, other things equal, discourages investment. Waterson (1985) considered
the implications of a quadratic tax function, again assuming a constant expected tax
bill. He concluded that, while the effect of progressivity on risk taking is positive for
certain parameter configurations, its sign cannot be established in general.9
Empirically, the impact of personal income tax progressivity on entry into self-
employment has been explored by Gentry and Hubbard (2000, 2005). They report
negative impacts of personal income progressivity on entrepreneurship. The main ex-
planation for these findings is that progressive taxation acts as a “success tax” on prof-
itable ventures: since entrepreneurs on average have higher incomes than employees,
6A corresponding analysis concerning personal income taxes has been provided by Varian (1980).
7Cullen and Gordon (2006b) have put it as follows: “For any given tax treatment of losses, a progressive
tax schedule on profits, holding expected taxes constant, should encourage risk taking. With progressive
rather than proportional taxes, the owners get to keep a smaller fraction of large profits but a larger fraction
of small profits. If expected tax payments are held fixed, this is a trade-off that any risk-averse individual
gains from making.”
8Cowell (1975) used the term “compensation” for what we refer to as the “constant expected tax bill”
condition.
9If entrepreneurial ventures are externally financed and entrepreneurs are subject to moral hazard (i.e. they
have an incentive to shirk if their stake in the success of the venture is low), then the risk-reducing element
implicit in progressive taxation may impede entrepreneurship (see e.g. Keuschnigg and Nielsen 2004; and
Hagen and Sannarnes 2007). To the extent that the incidence of progressive taxation is felt by financiers
rather than by entrepreneurs, however, the findings of the earlier literature on taxation and risk taking still
apply.
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progressive income taxation discourages entrepreneurial risk taking. Crucially, how-
ever, this effect confounds the impact of tax progressivity with that of the expected
tax bill.10
Cullen and Gordon (2007) have estimated a model of entrepreneurial risk, con-
trolling for both level and progressivity effects of corporate tax schedules using US
data. Entrepreneurial risk taking is defined empirically as the fraction of single tax
filers who report active non-corporate losses in excess of 10 percent of reported wage
income. While their estimated regression coefficients represent the impact of com-
posite terms capturing “income shifting” and “combined risk” effects inherent in the
tax code, and therefore elude simple interpretation, their derived simulation results
reported in Cullen and Gordon (2006a) show that a revenue-neutral shift to a flat tax
à la Hall and Rabushka (2007) would reduce entrepreneurial risk taking by more than
half. Their results are thus consistent with economically significant insurance effects.
The main difference between our approach and that of Cullen and Gordon (2006a,
2007) is that we explore the impact of taxation on the birth rates of incorporated
firms across different locations, whereas they focus on entrepreneurial individuals
reporting high losses across quantiles of predicted potential earnings. Our empirical
setting offers inter-jurisdictional variation in the entire tax schedule. It thereby allows
a simple quantification of the various relevant dimensions of tax policy.
2.3 The tax complexity effect
A third way in which a change to a flat corporate income tax could potentially in-
fluence entrepreneurship (in sectors other than accounting and legal services) is by
simplifying compliance via a reduction in complexity. Complexity has two compo-
nents: the number of tax brackets and the definition of the tax base.
First, calculating tax liabilities is simpler with a single statutory tax rate than with
a progressive tax schedule featuring multiple tax brackets. It seems reasonable, how-
ever, to question the practical importance of the complexity implied by progressive
schedules alone.11
The most compelling case for the view that complexity raises compliance costs
can be made if one moves beyond the narrow implications of progressivity alone
and considers the statutory definitions of the tax base. Administrative complications
are most evident where numerous different types of tax base are distinguished and
where the definitions of tax bases are subject to exceptions, deductions, tax credits
and the like. Such complexity is not a necessary correlate of progressivity, but flat-tax
proposals usually involve a reduction both in progressivity and in the complexity of
the determination of the tax base.
10Gentry and Hubbard (2000, 2005) have regressed the probability that an individual switches from em-
ployment to self-employment on a set of variables including (a) the projected tax rate in case of unchanged
employment status and (b) a measure of tax progressivity computed as the difference in tax rates between a
“successful” scenario, where taxable income increases by x percent, and an “unsuccessful” scenario, where
taxable income decreases by y percent. They did not, however, control for the expected (i.e. probability
weighted) tax rate in case of a switch to self-employment.
11To cite Slemrod and Bakija (2004, p. 166), “a graduate tax-rate structure does not by itself directly
contribute any significant complexity to the taxpaying process. Once taxable income is computed, looking
up tax liability in the tax tables is a trivial operation (. . . ).”
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Edmiston et al. (2004) found that the number of special corporate tax rates had
a significantly negative impact on flows of foreign direct investment into European
and Asian transition countries in the 1990s. However, and somewhat paradoxically,
they report positive coefficients on an alternative complexity variable defined as the
number of lines in the respective tax codes (similar to the measure that we will ap-
ply).12 We are not aware of any prior empirical work relating firm births to the two
components of tax complexity.
3 A simple model of tax progressivity and entrepreneurship
In this section, we present a highly stylized model to formalize the effect of pro-
gressivity on entrepreneurial risk taking, given a certain expected tax bill. As
noted above, this effect has been analyzed before (Ahsan 1974; Cowell 1975;
Waterson 1985). We propose a simple framework primarily for its heuristic value.13
Suppose a risk-averse entrepreneur has to choose where to locate her firm. She
will make a high or low profit at the end of the year with a certain probability. The
only salient difference between two potential locations arises from their corporate
income tax schedules: one location features a flat tax while the other location has a
progressive schedule. We ask which location the entrepreneur is better off choosing,
provided that the expected corporate tax payments are the same in both locations.
This constant expected tax bill condition is crucial to our analysis. Keeping the ex-
pected after-tax profit constant, progressive taxation reduces the variance of profits by
more than linear taxation. As a consequence, tax progressivity serves as an insurance
device: in bad times, an entrepreneur has to pay less than under a flat tax, whereas in
good times the tax bill is higher. This, in a nutshell, is how progressivity can favor
entrepreneurial risk taking.
To formalize the intuition, consider a risk-averse entrepreneur with a standard
Bernoulli utility function over income w, U(w), with Uw(w) > 0 and Uww(w) < 0.
The entrepreneur faces a simple lottery L = (pL,pH ) over two possible profit out-
comes {πL,πH }, with πH > πL and πL = 0.14
Profits are subject to either a flat or progressive tax schedule, defined as:
• flat tax rate: t
• progressive tax rate: tprogL = t + kL if π = πL and tprogH = t + kH if π = πH with
kL < 0 < kH , where kL, kH are constants.
12Edmiston et al. (2004) explain the apparent positive effect of the length of tax codes by pointing out
that more lines could imply greater legal precision—an aspect which might indeed be relevant in transition
countries.
13The main simplification of our approach compared to existing theory is that we constrain the range of
choices to two options. This simplification allows us to posit a general (Bernoulli) utility function, which,
unlike those adopted in prior studies, need not exhibit increasing absolute risk aversion (see also Feldstein
1969). Cullen and Gordon (2006a) propose a similar model, taking utility as the log of income.
14This framework also applies to cases where πL < 0. In such cases, the corporate tax rate turns negative,
implying a subsidy (e.g. through loss-offset or carry-forward provisions). Since taxation in our model does
not include a lump-sum tax part (payable independently of the realization of profits), we exclude πL = 0.
In our model, if πL = 0, only πH would be taxed (at the same rate as the flat tax rate).
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In addition, we impose the following three conditions:
Condition 1 (Constant expected tax bill condition) The expected tax bill is constant:
[t + kL]pLπL + [t + kH ]pHπH = tpLπL + tpHπH .
Hence, expected after-tax income is assumed to be the same under the two tax
schedules.
Condition 2 (Spread condition)
Risk is a function of the spread (the difference) of the two outcomes, πL and πH ,
whereas the probabilities and expected pre-tax profits are held constant.
This defines πL:
πL = Π¯ − p¯HπH
p¯L
, (1)
where Π¯ = pLπL + pHπH ≥ 0 is expected pre-tax profit, and upper bars design
constants.
This condition implies that an increase in the variance of post-tax income w (and
thus in risk) follows only from an increase in the spread of the two pre-tax profit
levels. For notational ease, we suppress the upper bars henceforth.15
Conditions 1 and 2 allow us to express kL as a function of πL, πH and kH :
kL = − pHπH
Π − pHπH kH . (2)
Condition 3 (No-reversal condition) Post-tax income in the low-profit outcome can-
not be higher than post-tax income in the high-profit outcome:
[1 − t − kL]πL ≤ [1 − t − kH ]πH .
Hence, tax rates are not allowed to be so progressive as to reverse the ordering of
the post-tax outcomes relative to the pre-tax outcomes.
Expected utility with a flat-tax schedule then takes the following form:
EU
(
wflat
) = pLU
([1 − t]πL
) + pHU
([1 − t]πH
)
= pLU
(
[1 − t]Π − pHπH
pL
)
+ pHU
([1 − t]πH
)
,
while expected utility with a progressive tax schedule becomes
EU
(
wprog
) = pLU
([1 − t − kL]πL
) + pHU
([1 − t − kH ]πH
)
= pLU
([
1 − t + pHπH
Π − pHπH kH
]
Π − pHπH
pL
)
+ pHU
([1 − t − kH ]πH
)
.
15In what follows, brackets are used for mathematical operations, whereas parentheses are used for func-
tions.
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We can now explore whether a change from a flat to a progressive tax schedule
benefits a risk-averse entrepreneur.
Proposition 1 Expected utility is higher with a progressive tax schedule than with a
flat-rate tax:
∂[EU(wprog) − EU(wflat)]
∂kH
∣∣∣∣
kH =0
> 0.
Proof Taking the derivative with respect to kH around kH = 0 results in
∂EU(w)
∂kH
∣∣∣
∣
kH =0
= −pHπH
[
Uw
(
w
prog
H
) − Uw
(
w
prog
L
)]
> 0,
where EU(w) = EU(wprog) − EU(wflat), and Uw(wprog ) = Uw([1 − t − k]π),
 = {L,H }. 
This is the insurance effect: progressive taxation reduces the variance (and thus
risk) by more than a flat rate. Therefore, the expected utility of after-tax income is
higher under progressive taxation and a risk-averse entrepreneur prefers progressive
to flat taxation.
The logic of this simple model can be applied both to the location decision (choice
between a location with a progressive tax and a location with a flat tax) and the
entry-into-self-employment decision. Figure 1 illustrates this. Take the location de-
cision, and suppose the two possible realizations πL and πH are equally probable.
The entrepreneur can choose between two locations. The first one has a flat tax rate,
and the corresponding after-tax realizations of πL and πH are wflatL and w
flat
H , re-
spectively. At the second location, after-tax realizations of π are wprogL and w
prog
H .
By the definition of progressive taxation and given the no-reversal condition, wflatL
< w
prog
L < w
prog
H < w
flat
H . From the concavity of the utility function it follows that ex-
pected utility with a progressive tax, EU(wprog), is higher than expected utility with
a flat tax, EU(wflat): the entrepreneur prefers the location with the progressive tax.
The same analysis can be applied to the entry decision. Again, suppose equally
probable realizations πL and πH . Suppose that under a progressive tax the poten-
tial entrepreneur is just indifferent between entering self-employment and being em-
ployed, in which case she receives a fixed wage corresponding to the certainty equiv-
alent of EU(wprog).16 Imagine a switch to a flat tax. As a consequence, and easily
seen in Fig. 1, the expected utility from being self-employed, EU(wflat) decreases
and so does the corresponding certainty equivalent (not drawn). Now, the potential
entrepreneur unequivocally prefers remaining in risk-free employment.
It is intuitive, given the logic of the insurance effect of progressive taxation, that
this effect becomes more pronounced for riskier ventures: the greater is the disper-
sion of uncertain outcomes, the more a potential entrepreneur stands to gain from
progressive taxation. This can be expressed formally as follows.
16The certainty equivalent of EU(wprog) is not represented in Fig. 1. From Jensen’s inequality it follows
that this point is located to the left of E(wflat, prog).
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Fig. 1 Expected utility with flat and progressive taxation
Proposition 2 The greater is the spread between πL and πH , the more an increase
in progressivity is preferred:
∂2EU(w)
∂kH ∂πH
> 0.
Proof See Appendix A. 
4 Empirical model and data
4.1 A count model of firm births
Our empirical project is straightforward: we seek to estimate the impact of the level,
the progressivity and the complexity of corporate taxes on entrepreneurial activity.
We represent entrepreneurial activity by the entry of new firms. New firms can be
created in a jurisdiction through two basic processes. In the “latent-startup” process,
immobile local residents are potential entrepreneurs who continuously compute the
discounted expected utility from creating a firm and become active once that value
exceeds the utility associated with their outside option. In the “footloose-startup”
process, entrepreneurs are mobile and scan potential locations for the best certainty
equivalent profit opportunity, conditional on having decided to set up a firm.
Despite the fundamental differences between the two processes, they have both
been shown formally to be compatible with a Poisson count model of firm births. The
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latent-startup process has been modeled by Becker and Henderson (2000) and shown
to lead directly to a Poisson model, subject to standard regularity conditions. Start-
ing with Carlton (1983), the footloose-startup process has traditionally been modeled
through a conditional logit representation, which can be formally derived from firm-
level profit functions. Guimaraes et al. (2003) have demonstrated that Poisson esti-
mation with group fixed effects returns identical coefficients to those obtained with
conditional logit estimation.17
We can therefore directly write an expression for E(nijt ), the expected number of
new firms (or of jobs in new firms) created in jurisdiction i, sector j and year t :
E(nijt ) = λijt
= exp(α1 corptaxlevelij t + α2 corptaxprogressivityit
+ α3 riskj ∗ corptaxprogressivityit + α4 corptaxcomplexityit
+ β ′ taxcontrolsij t + γ ′ othercontrolsij t + θ ′dj + ζ ′dt
)
, (3)
where nijt follows a Poisson distribution, corptaxlevel is a measure of the expected
average corporate income tax rate, corptaxprogressivity is a measure of the overall
progressivity of the corporate income tax schedule, corptaxcomplexity is a measure of
the complexity of the corporate tax code, risk is a measure of the inherent riskiness of
entrepreneurial ventures in sector j , taxcontrols is a vector of variables to represent
tax burdens other than those on corporate profits, othercontrols is a vector of non-tax
factors influencing the likelihood of firm births, dj is a set of sector dummies, and dt
is a set of year dummies.
Our four hypotheses are:
1. α1 < 0 (the effect on firm births of the expected corporate income tax level is
negative),
2. α2 > 0 (following Proposition 1, the effect on firm births of tax progressivity is
positive),
3. α3 > 0 (following Proposition 2, the positive effect of tax progressivity is stronger
in inherently riskier sectors), and
4. α4 < 0 (the effect on firm births of tax schedule complexity is negative).
4.2 Identification and inference
When seeking to identify the coefficients of our empirical model (3), we face the
potential problem that, in general, corporate tax rules may be both cause and con-
sequence of firms’ location choices. Resident firms influence local tax provisions
through the local tax base or through the political process of local tax setting. Our
strategy for avoiding potential simultaneity bias is to study location choices of new
firms in narrow sectors. While it is easy to conceive how existing firms in a jurisdic-
tion together may influence local taxation, we consider it highly unlikely that entrants
17The interpretation of the estimated coefficients, can be quite different; with the conditional logit implying
a “zero-sum” reallocation of a fixed number of firms and the Poisson implying a pure “positive-sum” tax-
induced generation of new firms (Schmidheiny and Brülhart 2011).
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in a particular sector, location and period exert significant and systematic influence
on pre-existing local tax rates. In our empirical setting, local jurisdictions are legally
bound to apply identical statutory taxes across all sectors.18 We therefore consider
tax rates to be exogenous not only from the viewpoint of an individual firm but also
from that of a cohort of new firms in a particular sector, location and period.19
Another challenge to identification concerns the variable corptaxlevel, which
stands for the expected corporate tax rate. With progressive tax schedules, the ex-
pected tax rate depends on expected profitability, which also affects the rate of firm
births. Hence, our estimates of α1 might be biased. Furthermore, to underestimate
expected profitability would tend to bias estimates of α2 and α3 downward, and to
overestimate it would tend to bias them upward, because progressivity would then
correlate with the mismeasured expected tax rate. Specifically, when expected prof-
itability is underestimated, this will tend to induce a positive correlation between the
unobserved component of the true expected tax rate and the progressivity measure,
thus biasing downward the estimated α2. It is therefore important to take account of
any systematic differences in expected profitability. We compute corptaxlevel sep-
arately for each sector-location pair, based on observed sector-average profitability
rates. To the extent that firms’ expected profitability is sector specific conditional on
the included regressors, our coefficient estimates will be unbiased.
Finally, we need to think carefully about potential specification and omitted-
variable bias. In the absence of a natural experiment and of sufficient intertemporal
variation, we have to rely essentially on cross-section identification. Our approach is
to control for all conceivably relevant determinants of firm births in addition to the
tax variables and to test the robustness of the estimated tax effects across a range of
specifications. The smallness and institutional homogeneity of Switzerland plays to
our advantage in this respect, as it facilitates our task of generating an exhaustive set
of controls.
Some features of our research design affect inference. First, the Poisson model
implies that the expected count, λijt , is equal to the variance of nijt . This is a strong
assumption in our applications, as the variance mostly exceeds the expected count
(overdispersion), and as we observe a large number of zero observations on the
dependent variable. Second, our model includes several explanatory variables that
are purely municipality-year specific (such as the progressivity of the corporate tax
schedule), while the dependent variable is municipality-sector-year specific. Such
aggregate variables bias the estimated standard errors downward if not correctly ad-
justed for (Moulton 1986). Third, we observe firm startups over five years. We cannot
18Corporate taxation in Switzerland is based on legally binding statutory rates that depend solely on firms’
profitability and capital base. The definitions of these tax bases have been harmonized countrywide by a
federal law that has been in force since 1993 and that foresees no firm-specific or sector-specific regimes
except for some clauses to avoid double taxation of holding companies. Some (mainly industrial) firms
can be offered tax rebates for a maximum of ten years after setting up a new operation. Available evidence
suggests that they affect less than 4 percent of new firms (Brülhart et al. 2012).
19In principle, there could be unobserved exogenous shocks that have direct causal effects on both the
progressivity of local tax schedules and on sector-level firm births, thus potentially biasing our estimated
tax effects. While such a configuration does not strike us as likely, we cannot rule it out categorically, as
our data do not allow us to instrument the tax variables. We seek to mitigate this potential problem by
including a large set of controls.
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exploit this panel structure by including location-sector fixed effects, as the changes
over time in our main explanatory are too small for the identification of any statisti-
cally significant effects. However, the possible presence of location-sector random ef-
fects needs to be taken into account when estimating standard errors. All three issues
are addressed by clustering standard errors in the two dimensions: by municipality-
year and by municipality-sector. We therefore apply multi-way clustering as proposed
by Cameron et al. (2011). Clustering by municipality-year takes care of the second is-
sue discussed above, clustering by municipality-sector addresses the third issue, and
either of the clusters automatically accommodates the first issue.20
4.3 Data
4.3.1 The Swiss corporate tax system
Several features of its political structure and tax system make Switzerland particu-
larly well suited to serve as a laboratory for research on the effects of fiscal policy.
Specifically, the Swiss system features three propitious characteristics.
1. Local tax autonomy
Swiss taxes on corporate as well as on personal income are levied at three
hierarchically nested jurisdictional levels: by the federal government, by the 26
cantons and by some 2,700 municipalities. The federal government taxes prof-
its at a flat rate of 8.5 % and does not tax corporate capital. The cantons enjoy
complete autonomy in the setting of their tax schedules. They all levy taxes on
profits and corporate capital as well as on personal income and wealth. In 21 of
the 26 cantons, municipalities apply a single multiplier to the applicable cantonal
tax schedules.21 In the remaining cantons, the same multiplier applies to all mu-
nicipalities within the canton, implying no municipal autonomy (see Table 1, last
column).
2. Heterogenous tax schedules
The autonomy of local tax setters yields large intra-national variance in taxa-
tion. The geography of corporate tax burdens is illustrated in Fig. 2, which shows
consolidated cantonal and municipal average corporate income tax rates on a rep-
resentative firm for the 26 cantonal capitals. The highest tax rate (Geneva, 23.5 %)
exceeds the lowest tax rate (Zug, 6.4 %) by a factor of nearly four. As can be
gleaned from Figs. 3 and 4 for 2001 and 2005, respectively, the progressivity of
these tax schedules exhibits similar intra-national heterogeneity. Eleven cantons,
among them the cantons of Zurich (since 2005) and Geneva, apply a flat tax rate
on profits. The remaining fifteen cantons apply progressive schedules with two or
20Clustering being a variant of the Eicker–White “sandwich” variance estimator, it provides consistent
standard error estimates even in the presence of overdispersion (see e.g. Cameron and Trivedi 1998, p.
65f.). We also estimated our standard errors using one-way clustering by municipality and three-way clus-
tering by municipality, sector and year, but did not find our inference results to be significantly affected.
21In 8 of those 21 cantons, municipalities decide on a single multiplier that applies to both personal and
corporate taxes. In the remaining 13 cantons, at least some municipalities apply separate multipliers to the
two tax bases. See also Brülhart and Jametti (2006).
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more tax brackets. Additional heterogeneity arises from the fact that some cantons
base the calculation of the simple tax on the amount of profits, others on profitabil-
ity, and some on a combination. Recent changes have without exception been in
the direction of flatter tax schedules, as is evident in Fig. 5.
3. Comparable jurisdictions
Switzerland has an area of 41,285 square kilometers and a population of
7.5 million. It therefore covers about twice the area, and hosts roughly the same
population, as the US state of Massachusetts. Many hard-to-measure geographical,
cultural or political differences that affect international comparisons should not be
of much concern in a study across jurisdictions at such a small spatial scale. In
addition, institutional features such as the social security system, unemployment
insurance and health insurance are either governed by federal law or substantively
harmonized across cantons.
As our interest is in differential firm birth rates as a function of differences in
tax schedules, we need to ascertain that corporate income taxes indeed affect these
firms. In Switzerland, distributed profits are taxed twice, first at the level of the firm,
through the corporate income tax, and then at the level of the individuals receiving
dividend payments, through the personal income tax. When a profitable firm’s owners
are also their employees—a frequent occurrence in startup firms—then these owners
have an incentive to declare these profits as wages in order to avoid the corporate
income tax. If there were no limits to this practice, the corporate income tax would
become largely irrelevant for firms run by owner-employees. Swiss fiscal law, how-
ever, explicitly bans the “disguised” distribution of profits via inflated wages, and
jurisprudence consistently applies the “arm’s-length principle”, whereby wage pay-
ments to owner-employees have to conform to standard remuneration levels in the
given occupation and sector.22 Therefore, corporate income taxation is of relevance
also to small owner-run firms.
4.3.2 Variables used
Our study is based on a municipality-sector level panel data set for the five years
from 2001 to 2005. The number of municipalities for which we have the required tax
data ranges from 665 in 2001, covering 72 percent of the Swiss population, to 846 in
2005, covering 83 percent of the population.23 Sectors are defined according to the
two-digit level of Eurostat’s NACE classification, which distinguishes 51 sectors.24
Table 2 lists our variables and data sources, Table 3 reports summary statistics.
22See Henneberger and Ziegler (2008).
23The average population of our sample municipalities was 7,928 in 2001 and 7,243 in 2005. These mu-
nicipalities were host to 85 (89) percent of all new firms in 2001 (2005). The data cover roughly the upper
size quartile of Swiss municipalities. Tax data for smaller municipalities are not collected centrally.
24A more sectorally disaggregated approach is not possible since our data on the distribution of profits
and capital are available at the two-digit level only. We were forced to omit four sectors, for which no firm
births were observed in our sample period: NACE 10 (coal mining), 12 (ore mining), 13 (uranium mining)
and 23 (coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel). We also had to drop NACE 16 (tobacco) due to missing
wage data. We therefore work with 46 sectors throughout.
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Table 2 Data sources
Dependent variables
newfirms Swiss Federal Statistical Office (UDEMO database)
newjobs Swiss Federal Statistical Office (UDEMO database)
Corporate tax variables
corptaxlevel Own calculations, based on statutory tax data from the official compendium
of cantonal tax laws (Steuern der Schweiz, editions 2001–2005), on
cantonal and municipal tax multipliers obtained from the 26 cantonal tax
authorities, and on sectoral profitability data for 2004 obtained from the tax
authorities of the canton of Aargau
corptaxprogressivity1-3 Own calculations, based on statutory tax data from the official compendium
of cantonal tax laws (Steuern der Schweiz, editions 2001–2005), on
cantonal and municipal tax multipliers obtained from the 26 cantonal tax
authorities, and on national profitability data published by the Swiss Federal
Finance Administration
risk Own calculations, based on sectoral profitability data for 2004 from the tax
authorities of the canton of Aargau
corptaxbrackets Own calculations, based on statutory tax data from the official compendium
of cantonal tax laws (Steuern der Schweiz, editions 2001–2005)
corptaxwordcount Own calculations, based on the official compendium of cantonal tax laws
(Steuern der Schweiz, editions 2001–2005)
captaxlevel Own calculations, based on statutory tax data from the Swiss Federal Tax
Administration and on sectoral profitability data provided by the tax
authorities of the canton of Aargau
dividendprovision Official compendium of cantonal tax laws (Steuern der Schweiz, editions
2001–2005)
Personal tax variables
incometaxlevel Effective average tax rates published by the Swiss Federal Tax
Administration
incometaxprogressivity1-3 Own calculations, based on effective average tax rates published by the
Swiss Federal Tax Administration
wealthtaxlevel Effective average tax rates published by the Swiss Federal Tax
Administration
inheritancetax Official compendium of cantonal tax laws (Steuern der Schweiz, editions
2001–2005)
Other control variables
publicexp Swiss Federal Department of Finance
wage Swiss Federal Statistical Office
propertyprice Wüest & Partner
disthighway Swiss Federal Statistical Office
distairport Swiss Federal Statistical Office
distuniversity Swiss Federal Statistical Office
unemployment State Secretariat for Economic Affairs
munsize Swiss Federal Statistical Office
Note: For details on the construction of the variables, see Sect. 4.3.2
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Our dependent variable, newfirms, is the count of new firms per municipality, sec-
tor and year. The alternative dependent variable, newjobs, is the count of full-time
and part-time jobs created by those new firms. The data set covers all new firms cre-
ated in Switzerland between 2001 and 2005. The average new firm has 2.6 employees
at birth, and 43 percent of new firms have a single employee. Using newjobs as an
alternative regressand may be useful by reducing the weight of one-person firms in
driving our results. Firms are defined as market-oriented incorporated organizations
that are operating for at least 20 hours per week. New entities created by mergers,
takeovers, breakups or changes of legal form are not counted. Foreign firms’ first
subsidiary in Switzerland, however, is considered a new firm. This provides us with
data for 25,419 new firms and 64,927 new jobs created over the sample period.
The main component of the explanatory part of our model are corporate tax bur-
dens. In order to construct sector-specific representative corporate tax rates, we first
need data on representative profits and capital stocks. While nation-wide statistics
exist neither at the level of firms nor at the level of sectors, we can draw on a firm-
level data set for one of the 26 cantons (Aargau). This data set, obtained from the
cantonal tax authority, reports pre-tax profits and capital bases for 2004. It covers the
universe of 15,731 firms based in that canton, which represents 11 percent of Swiss
firms in 2004. We have several reasons to be confident that the micro data for Aargau
are representative of patterns for Switzerland at large. First, the overall distribution
of firm-level profits in that canton closely matches that for the whole country.25 Sec-
ond, the corporate tax burden in the canton of Aargau, computed by the federal tax
administration, is very close to the national average.26 Third, Aargau’s sectoral com-
position is very close to the national average. The correlation between the share of
NACE two-digit firms in Aargau and the corresponding national total 0.99 (data from
the 2001 establishment census). Finally, Aargau is quite representative also in terms
of urbanization—probably the most important covariate of firm structure. According
to federal statistics, the proportion of Aargau residents living in urban areas was 0.58
in 2001. The corresponding national share was 0.68. Given that the standard devi-
ation of these shares across cantons was 0.20, Aargau is close to the middle of the
distribution in this respect as well.
From the Aargau data we can compute average profits, average capital stocks and
average profitability for corporations with positive profits per two-digit sector.
Based on these data, we then construct sector-specific corporate income tax mea-
sures.
25The first, third and fifth sextiles for pre-tax rate of returns are 3, 12 and 37 percent (canton of Aar-
gau) against 2, 9 and 32 percent (Switzerland). The quantiles for Aargau are based on firm-level reported
profit data, whereas the national quantiles are calculated using the national profit and capital distributions
published by the Federal Tax Administration.
26The index of the corporate income tax burden computed by the Federal Tax Administration for the year
2004 has a value of 97.4 for the canton of Aargau. The national average is 100, with values ranging from
57.3 (Schwyz) to 126.7 (Geneva). Aargau levies a minimum corporate tax of 500 Swiss francs (≈500 US
dollars) on profits and capital together. Therefore, to calculate sector averages, we excluded all observa-
tions with a simple tax of 500 francs, even if they declared positive but very low profits. Furthermore, we
considered observations with an implied pre-tax rate of return of more than 200 percent to be unreliable
and excluded them.
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• Level of the corporate income tax (corptaxlevel): Based on statutory tax rates
and estimated industry-level average profits and capital stocks, we calculate the
industry-specific effective average tax rate (EATR) on profits for all sample mu-
nicipalities and years.27
• Progressivity of the corporate income tax (corptaxprogressivity): Based on the na-
tional distribution of capital and profitability across all sectors, we collected tax
rates for first, third and fifth sextile profitability firms, characterized by profits
amounting to 2, 9 and 32 percent, respectively, of own capital.28 This was done
separately for three capital levels, representing the first, second and third quartile
of the distribution of capital. Our three alternative progressivity measures are then
computed as weighted averages across the three representative capital levels.29
The first progressivity measure, corptaxprogressivity1, is the difference between
the EATR for firms with high (32 percent) and low (2 percent) profitability. The
second progressivity measure, corptaxprogressivity2, corrects for the tax level: we
divide corptaxprogressivity1 by the arithmetic mean of the EATR for firms with
low, median and high profitability. A third measure of progressivity, corptaxpro-
gressivity3, measures the redistributive impact of a given tax schedule compared
with a proportional tax. By construction, this index ranges from −1 to +1. A value
of corptaxprogressivity3 > 0 (< 0) indicates a progressive (regressive) tax sys-
tem, while corptaxprogressivity3 = 0 stands for a proportional system.30 These
three measures are highly but not perfectly correlated, with correlation coefficients
ranging from 0.89 to 0.98.
• Industry-specific risk (risk): In accordance with Condition 2, we define risk as
the standard deviation of industry profits, expressed as a deviation from the cross-
sector average standard deviation (risk therefore has mean zero), and based on the
27The Swiss corporate tax system allows corporations to deduct actual tax payments from their pre-tax
income. Therefore, our EATRs are defined as t
π (π−tKK)
(1+tπ )π , where π denotes pre-tax profits, K is own
capital, tπ is the statutory corporate income tax rate and tK is the statutory capital tax rate.
28Due to some small cell sizes, the Aargau data do not allow us to calculate sufficiently reliable sector-level
distributions. We therefore prefer to rely on frequency distributions for Switzerland as a whole (available
aggregated across sectors) for the profitability dispersion measure.
29The weights applied are 0.375 for the cases of low and high capital and 0.25 for the median-capital case,
thus taking into account that the low and high cases refer to the upper end of the first and third quartile, re-
spectively. The fact that two of our progressivity measures have negative minima (see Table 3) is explained
by one canton (Aargau) applying a fixed minimum tax of CHF 500 on all incorporated firms, which implies
regressive taxation for certain small firms with low profitability. Furthermore, the definition of EATRs im-
plies that there is some small within-canton variation in progressivity even though municipalities apply
a single multiplier to the canton-level tax schedule. Eliminating this variation by taking averages of the
progressivity measures within each canton and year has no discernible impact on our results.
30This measure is known as a “relative share adjustment” (see, e.g., Kesselman and Cheung 2004). It is
a weighted average of a local index of tax progressivity, RSAk , where RSAk = 1−ATRk1−ATR − 1. ATRk is the
average tax rate for the kth income group, and ATR is the aggregate average tax rate. RSAk has an intuitive
interpretation, since it can be used to calculate the gain or loss to a specific income group of switching
to a fully proportional tax. For example, if RSAk = 0.03, a k-type taxpayer would suffer an income loss
of 3 percent if the existing system were replaced by a proportional tax. The global index of progressivity,
RSAG, is then calculated as follows: RSAG =
∑K
k=1 φkRSAk , where φk = θk(θk + 2
∑K
l=k+1 θl), and
θk = wk∑K
k=1 wk
is post-tax income share of the kth taxpayer (wk being post-tax income of the kth taxpayer).
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firm-level data for Aargau. This variable is then interacted with the three measures
of corporate tax progressivity to provide a test of Proposition 2.
• Complexity of the corporate income tax schedule (corptaxbrackets): Following
Slemrod (2005), we define corptaxbrackets as the number of different statutory
corporate income tax brackets.
• Complexity of the entire corporate tax code (corptaxwordcount): We define this
variable as the count of words in the cantonal corporate tax codes.31
In our baseline specification, we control for a range of additional potentially rele-
vant tax variables concerning both corporate and personal income (taxcontrols) and
for non-tax explanatory variables that are also likely to determine firm birth rates
(othercontrols). The list of those variables is given in Appendix B.
5 Results
5.1 Baseline estimates
We estimate equation (3) using fixed effects Poisson regression with two-way clus-
tered standard errors. Table 4 reports the baseline estimations for six different variants
of our empirical model.
Our results are reassuringly consistent across specifications: all corporate tax vari-
ables and all statistically significant controls retain their sign across the six regression
runs. Whether we define our dependent variable as counts of new firms (columns 1–3)
or as counts of jobs created by those new firms (columns 4–6), is of little consequence
to our estimates. Any observed regularities, therefore, do not seem to be driven by
particularly small or particularly large new firms. The estimated coefficient signs gen-
erally conform with expectations. Numbers of firm births are relatively high in large
municipalities, in municipalities with high (non-transfer) public expenditure and in
municipalities with high rates of unemployment (which imply fewer outside options
for “latent entrepreneurs”). Conversely, firm birth rates are relatively low in remote
municipalities (in terms of distance from the highway network). The one counterintu-
itive statistically significant result on the control variables concerns property prices,
for which we estimate a positive coefficient. This result very likely reflects the fact
that property prices correlate with certain relevant but unobserved location-specific
features without fully capitalizing them.
Turning to the corporate tax variables, we find confirmation for our main hypothe-
ses.
31Word counts are based on the official compendium of cantonal tax laws Steuern der Schweiz. This
compendium reproduces the content of all cantonal tax laws in a standardized format. It has the advantage
of using harmonized terminology and thus allowing meaningful comparisons of word counts. The fact that
three Swiss cantons are officially bilingual and have identical tax codes in both French and German allows
us to quantify the “excess words” in tax codes due to the French language. In the canton of Berne, the
French version of the tax code is 36 percent longer than the German one, and in the cantons of Fribourg
and Valais, these differences correspond to 44 and 29 percent, respectively. Thus, the average “surplus
word count” due to the French language is 37 percent. Therefore, we divide the word count for Latin
cantons by 1.37 (the tax code for the Italian-speaking canton of Ticino being recorded in French in the
compendium).
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1. The level of taxation has a statistically significantly negative impact, with our
corporate income tax variable corptaxlevel returning precisely estimated negative
coefficients throughout. The existence of a negative tax level effect is corrobo-
rated by the finding that capital taxes (captaxlevel), personal income taxes (in-
cometaxlevel) and inheritance taxes (inheritancetax) also consistently yield statis-
tically negative coefficient estimates. The only exception are wealth taxes (wealth-
taxlevel), for which we obtain positive coefficients. A possible explanation for this
result is that high wealth taxes act as an incentive for investing in privately held
corporations. Overall, however, the conclusion that high average taxes depress
firm births is strongly supported.
2. The estimated effects of tax progressivity are positive throughout, in line with our
Proposition 1. These coefficients are generally measured somewhat less precisely
than those on the tax level variables. Nonetheless, all six coefficients estimated on
the variants of corptaxprogressivity are found to be statistically significant at least
at the five percent level. Our estimated coefficients on the interactions of corporate
income tax progressivity with our proxy measures for sector-specific risk are all
positive, which is in line with Proposition 2. Only two of these interaction terms
are statistically significant (at the ten percent level), which is very likely due to the
inevitably approximate measure of risk in our empirical context. Taken together,
these estimates lend support to the prediction that, given a certain expected tax
bill, progressivity promotes firm births.
3. We find no significant evidence that the complexity of the corporate income tax
schedule itself (corptaxbrackets) affects the rate of firm births. The number of
different tax brackets per se therefore seems to be of no consequence for en-
trepreneurial activity. In contrast, the complexity of the overall corporate tax
code, measured via corptaxwordcount, has a statistically significantly negative
impact. Hence, entrepreneurship-promoting simplification of corporate taxation
would seem to be best achieved not by reducing the number of brackets of the tax
schedule but by simplifying the tax code.
Our reported estimates are identified primarily from cross-sectional variation
across municipality-sector pairs. We have also experimented with specifications that
include municipality fixed effects, thus identifying coefficients from year-on-year
changes in regressors.32 Given the slow-moving nature of most of our explanatory
variables, it is not surprising that these estimates have much lower explanatory power
and are mostly statistically insignificant. Interestingly, however, these estimates re-
turn statistically significantly positive coefficient estimates on the interaction terms
risk × corptaxprogressivity, thus further corroborating the presence of an insurance
effect.
5.2 Robustness
In Table 5, we report variations on the baseline estimates of Table 4, in order to gauge
their sensitivity. Given the similarity of the two sets of estimates reported in Table 4,
we now limit our analysis to specifications with firm counts as the dependent variable.
32These results can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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We report estimates for 15 specifications. In the first 12 runs, we alternatively
drop variables from the baseline regressions. In columns 1 to 3, we drop the control
for the sector-specific expected level of the corporate income tax bill, corptaxlevel.
This reverses the sign of the coefficients on corporate tax progressivity, implying a
negative effect of progressivity—in line with the “success tax” argument proposed by
Gentry and Hubbard (2000, 2005). These estimations show clearly that any verdict
on the implications of tax progressivity hinges on whether or not one controls for the
expected tax bill.
We also experiment with dropping the two complexity measures, corptaxbrackets
(columns 4 to 6) and corptaxwordcount (columns 7 to 9). These changes turn out
not to affect any of our coefficient estimates qualitatively, but they strengthen the
measured positive impact of corporate tax progressivity. This could suggest that pro-
gressivity tends to be associated with more complex tax codes. However, we observe
that it is especially the omission of the complexity measure corptaxwordcount that
boosts the estimated coefficients on the progressivity measures (columns 7 to 9), al-
though these variables are basically uncorrelated in the raw data. The low bivariate
correlations suggest that progressive schedules are perfectly compatible with simple
tax codes. The regression results, however, imply that, conditional on other factors,
these two variables do comove, and that this comovement to some extent dampens
the measured positive effect of corporate tax progressivity.
Next, we drop all variables not related to corporate taxation bar the scaling variable
munsize. These results are shown in columns 10 to 12 of Table 5. The signs and sig-
nificance levels on our coefficients of interest are reassuringly similar to those found
for the full model in Table 4. Unlike in the baseline estimations, the impact of capital
taxes is now estimated to be statistically significantly negative. The coefficients on
corptaxwordcount are up to 40 percent smaller, but they remain statistically signifi-
cantly negative throughout. Less plausibly, the coefficient on dividendprovision turns
statistically significant negative. Our main results, however, do not seem to be driven
by the particular set of conditioning variables chosen for the baseline estimations.
As a final robustness test, we replace the dependent variable by the count of new
sole proprietorships (newsoleprop), the main legal form of non-incorporated business
ventures.33 Since these organizations are not subject to corporate taxation, we expect
corporate tax-related regressors to have less of an influence. However, we do not ex-
pect corporate taxes to irrelevant, as many new firms start out as sole proprietorships
with the aim of incorporating later. Hence, rational forward-looking entrepreneurs
will be sensitive to corporate taxation even if they choose to operate (initially) as sole
proprietorships. This is indeed what we find (see columns 13–15 of Table 5). The
level effect of corporate taxes remains statistically significant, but the size of the co-
efficient shrinks by more than one-half. None of the progressivity variables remains
statistically significant. It is furthermore reassuring to note that the coefficients on
dividendprovision are statistically significantly negative, indicating that such provi-
sions indeed reduce recourse to non-incorporated organizational forms.
We have conducted a number of additional sensitivity tests not reported here but
available on request. The main alternatives we tried were (a) models with newjobs
33We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting us to consider also non-incorporated organizations.
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as the dependent variable, (b) models with the coefficient on the exposure variable
munsize forced to unity, (c) models with municipality-level fixed effects, (d) models
with canton-level instead of municipality-level personal tax variables, (e) models with
sector-level coefficient estimates on wage and propertyprice to account for different
factor intensities, and (f) models with additional controls (for municipal debt burdens,
urban areas, length of lake shores, individual components of public expenditure, and
local unemployment rates). To the extent that they were still identified with these
alternative specifications, none of our qualitative findings turned out to be affected.
5.3 Quantitative effects
Our central research question is qualitative in nature: does corporate tax progressivity
promote firm births, given the expected corporate tax bill? The answer appears to be
yes. We can go further than this, however, and evaluate the magnitudes of the various
determinants of firm births, related to taxes and otherwise. The Poisson coefficients
reported so far are semielasticities, measuring the proportionate change in the condi-
tional mean of firm births for a one-unit change in the respective regressor. Since the
scales of our regressors differ considerably (see Table 3), these semielasticities are
not directly comparable.
In Table 6, we therefore show transformations of the baseline estimates that can be
compared across variables. Columns 4 to 6 report elasticities, computed as the prod-
uct of the Poisson coefficients (columns 1–3) and the means of the relevant regressors
(column 10). These numbers give the percentage effect of a one-percent change in the
value of the respective regressor. As an alternative, we report semistandardized coef-
ficients in columns 7 to 9, defined as the product of the Poisson coefficients (columns
1–3) and the standard deviations of the relevant regressors (column 11). The semi-
standardized coefficients quantify the percentage effect of a one-standard-deviation
change in the value of the respective regressors.
Both sets of transformed coefficients highlight the importance of taxes for firm
births. Of all regressors included in our model, by far the strongest effects are mea-
sured for corporate tax levels, with an elasticity of around 3.3 in absolute value. Dif-
ferences in corporate income tax levels clearly have strong effects on firm formation
rates across Swiss municipalities.34
Our estimated percentage response of firm births with respect to a percentage-
point change in the corporate tax level (i.e. the implied semi-elasticity) is around
−0.2. This estimate can be compared to related studies that use intra-national data
on firm births. Not surprisingly, it is close to that found in Swiss data by Brülhart et
al. (2012), whose mean Poisson estimate is −0.3. It falls between the values found
by two other European studies. Using British data, Duranton et al. (2011) detected
no statistically significant effect on establishment entry. Rathelot and Sillard (2008),
using French data, estimated a semi-elasticity of −1.2. These differences in esti-
mated elasticities are likely due to differences in tax systems and in definitions of
34Our estimates suggest a more than proportional reaction of firm births to changes in corporate tax levels.
It would of course be erroneous to read into this a potential for revenue-increasing tax cuts, as our model
does not capture responses of the entire tax base.
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“new firms”. In particular, Swiss local corporate taxes are levied on profits while
their British and French counterparts are, respectively, levied on property areas and
physical capital. Since national corporate taxes are predominantly levied on profits,
the Swiss local context arguably offers a better approximation to international corpo-
rate tax differentials.
Second to the impact of the expected level of the corporate tax bill comes the
impact of the expected level of the personal tax bill, with an elasticity of slightly
above 1 in absolute value. Given the difficulty of attributing relevant personal tax
variables to municipalities (due to commuting), this variable likely suffers from some
mismeasurement. This in turn implies attenuation bias for the coefficient estimate,
which makes the strong estimated effect of personal taxes all the more noteworthy.
The third most important dimension of taxation is the complexity of the corporate tax
code (corptaxwordcount), with an elasticity of around −0.9. All other aspects of the
tax code have comparatively minor effects on firm births. The average elasticity with
respect to the progressivity of corporate taxes is estimated at around 0.08—an order
of magnitude smaller than the complexity effect. The smallest quantitative effect of
all tax variables is found for corptaxbrackets and dividendprovision, with an average
elasticity of very close to zero.
In sum, we find a clear hierarchy of tax effects, with tax levels having by far
the strongest impact on firm birth rates, the complexity of tax codes coming second,
and the progressivity of tax schedules having a comparatively small but statistically
significantly positive impact.
6 Conclusion
Tax reforms in the spirit of the “flat-tax” model aim to reduce three parameters: the
average tax rate, the progressivity of the tax schedule, and the complexity of the tax
code. Using data on sub-federal jurisdictions in Switzerland, we estimate the separate
effects of these three components of corporate income taxes on the incidence of firm
births. Although we work with panel data, the slow-moving nature of the tax variables
implies that identification is based mainly on cross-sectional variation.
Our results confirm that lower average tax rates and reduced complexity of the tax
code promote firm births. Controlling for these effects, we find evidence that reduced
progressivity inhibits firm births. Our reading of this result is that tax progressivity
has an insurance effect that facilitates entrepreneurial risk taking.35
The positive effects of lower tax levels and reduced complexity are estimated to be
significantly stronger than the negative effect of reduced progressivity. To the extent
that firm births reflect desirable entrepreneurial dynamism, it is not the flattening
of tax schedules that is key to successful tax reforms, but the lowering of average
35An alternative interpretation could be that new firms prefer more progressive tax schedules, given an
expected tax bill, because they are credit constrained: the lower tax liability in case of a bad profit outcome
may offer a greater gain in terms of access to external funding than the loss implied by a higher tax liability
in case of a good outcome. See Keuschnigg and Ribi (2009) for a model of corporate income taxation with
credit-constrained firms.
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tax burdens and the simplification of tax codes.36 Flatness per se is of secondary
importance and even appears to be detrimental to firm births.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 2
From (1) and (2) it follows that
∂πL
∂πH
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, (4)
and
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36Firm births in our data could in principle also be the result of “income shifting” from bigger to smaller
incorporated units, or through the incorporation of sole proprietorships. Data permitting, it would be inter-
esting in future work to analyze these two margins separately from genuine startup ventures.
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Appendix B: Control variables
The list of baseline explanatory tax variables (taxcontrols) is as follows.
• Level of capital tax (captaxlevel): We calculate an industry-specific EATR on cor-
porate capital for all municipalities and years.
• Provisions to alleviate double taxation of dividends (dividendprovision): Dummy
variable which is set equal to 1 if a canton has a reduced tax rate on dividend
income and to 0 otherwise.
• Level of the personal income tax (incometaxlevel): The Swiss federal tax adminis-
tration publishes representative EATRs on personal income for all of the munici-
palities in our sample.37 As we cannot know what municipality the owners of our
sample firms reside in, we have considered two hypotheses for all personal taxes:
(a) firm owners live in the municipality their firm is located in, or (b) owners live
in the canton their firm is located in. Since the results do not differ significantly,
we report results based on the second hypothesis. We thus compute incometaxlevel
as the weighted average personal income tax burden, using the published cantonal
sample mean of the EATR on low, median and high income households (corre-
sponding to the first, third and fifth sextile of the national household income distri-
bution).
• Progressivity of the personal income tax (incometaxprogressivity): Based on
the published canton-average EATR on low, median and high income, we de-
fine incometaxprogressivity1, incometaxprogressivity2 and incometaxprogressiv-
ity3 analogously to corptaxprogressivity1-3.
• Level of the wealth tax (wealthtaxlevel): We compute this variable as the cantonal-
average EATRs for a person with taxable wealth of 300,000 Swiss francs
(≈300,000 US dollars), which corresponds approximately to the mean wealth level
among individuals with non-zero declared wealth over our sample period.
• Inheritance tax (inheritancetax): This variable takes the value of 1 if a canton has
an inheritance tax for direct descendants in a given year and 0 otherwise.
The list of baseline non-tax explanatory variables (othercontrols) is as follows.
• Public expenditure (publicexp): Firms not only pay taxes, they may also benefit
from public spending. We construct this variable as the sum of municipal and can-
tonal per-capita public spending, excluding social transfers and deflated with the
consumer price index. The public spending items included in publicexp are pub-
lic administration, security, education, culture and sports, roads, and public trans-
port.38
37The published EATRs correspond to average cantonal, municipal and church tax rates for a representa-
tive household (married couple with two children) and for a range of reference incomes.
38Annual municipal expenditures are only available for the 26 canton capitals and 16 other municipalities.
However, the Swiss Federal Finance Administration publishes overall annual municipal spending for each
canton. We compute annual municipal spending for the other municipalities by subtracting the expenditure
of the (26+16) municipalities from overall municipal expenditures and then dividing it by the population
of the remaining municipalities. Thereby, the remaining municipalities are attributed identical values of
publicexp within each canton.
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• Wage level (wage): We control for average monthly wages per sector and region,
deflated by the consumer price index.39
• Property prices (propertyprice): This variable is defined as the unweighted average
of median municipality–year-level market prices per square meter of retail space,
office space and industrial real estate, deflated by the consumer price index.40
• Geography: To capture accessibility (and thus potentially agglomeration effects),
we include three additional control variables: disthighway, the road distance from
every municipality to the nearest highway access, distairport, the road distance
to the nearest international airport, and distuniversity, the distance to the nearest
university.
• Culture (latin): We control for potential cultural and attitudinal differences by in-
troducing the dummy variable latin that takes the value of 1 if the main language
of a canton is French or Italian and 0 if it is German.
• Unemployment (unemploymentrate): We control for the population share of regis-
tered unemployed workers by municipality and year.
• Size of the municipality (munsize): We use the log of the average resident popula-
tion per year and municipality as the exposure variable.
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